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TRYSTS OR TERRORISTS?
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE SEARCH FOR
BAD GUYS
Richard K. Gordon*

INTRODUCTION
In early March of 2008, the news broke that Eliot Spitzer, the
then-current Governor and former Attorney General of New York,
had been involved in purchasing sexual favors from an elite escort
service called the Emperors Club.1 What was unusual about the
unfolding story was not just that a sitting governor would patronize
such an establishment, but that his involvement had apparently
been uncovered in part as a result of reports filed by banks under
federal anti–money laundering policies and policies combating the
financing of terrorism.2 Spitzer’s secret love life had been exposed
by a regime designed primarily to catch serious criminals and
terrorist financers and to grab their funds for the public fisc.3
Apparently Governor Spitzer had paid for services by having his
bank, North Fork, transfer funds from his account to at least two
“shell” companies controlled by the Emperors Club.4 According to
* Associate Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of
Law; Visiting Fellow in International Studies, the Watson Institute, Brown
University, Fall 2008. B.A. 1978, Yale; J.D. 1984, Harvard. From 1994 through
2003 the author served as a senior staff member at the International Monetary
Fund where he worked on the development and implementation of the
international standards for anti-money laundering and, following the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001 on the United States, combating the financing of
terrorism. The views expressed in this paper are the author’s alone and should
not be attributed to the International Monetary Fund. The author would like to
thank Professor Craig Boise and the participants in the Wake Forest Law
Review Symposium for their comments and the students who participated in
the Spring 2007 Case Western Reserve University School of Law seminar
Financial Sector Integrity for their contribution to this article.
1. Danny Hakim & William Rashbaum, Spitzer, Linked to a Sex Ring as a
Client, Gives an Apology, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2008, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/10/nyregion/10cndspitzer.html?_r=1&hp&oref
=slogin.
2. Moisés Naím, Caught in the Wrong Net; Spitzer and the CEO Were Both
Toppled by a Post-9/11 Hardening of Views on Global Money Laundering,
NEWSWEEK (International Edition), Mar. 31, 2008, available at
http://www.newsweek.com/id/128422.
3. Id.
4. Keith B. Richburg et al., FBI Watched Spitzer Before February
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an article in Newsweek by Moisés Naím (who is also the editor of
Foreign Policy):
The inquiry into the Emperors Club . . . began last year,
whena bank, HSBC, reported to U.S. Authorities [meaning
FinCen,the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network] that the
accountsof two companies, QAT and QAT Consulting Group,
wereregularly receiving deposits from questionable sources.
Severalof the transfers had come from accounts that seemed
set up tomask the sender’s identity.
The investigation
ultimatelyrevealed that the person in question wasn’t a drug
dealer or aterrorist. It was the governor of New York.5

Newsday reported that the investigation began with “tips” from
banks that noticed unusual wire transfers between Spitzer’s account
and “shell companies,” i.e. QAT International and QAT Consulting
Group, set up by the Emperors Club.6 According to the affidavit filed
in support of the sealed complaint, QAT Consulting Group, Inc. and
QAT International, Inc. were used to “promote” and “conceal” the
prostitution business of the Emperors Club.7 Again according to
news reports, both Spitzer’s bank and the bank where QAT and
QAT Consulting Group held accounts filed Suspicious Activity
Reports (“SARs”) with the government, which ultimately led to an
investigation of Spitzer and the Emperors Club.8
While press reports vary, the more specific facts appear to be
these. North Fork detected Spitzer engaging in “unusual financial
transactions” by making “large cash transfers” that did not fit his
“usual pattern for the accounts,” which triggered concern in the
bank.9 One source also reported that, after transferring the funds,
Spitzer called North Fork and asked that his name “be removed”
from one of the wires, which lead the bank to file a SAR.10 The
affidavit attached to the SAR quoted a telephone call from an
Incident,
WASH. POST,
Mar.
12,
2008,
at
A1,
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/story/2008/03/11/ST2008031102
183.html.
5. Naím, supra note 3.
6. Michael
Amon,
Rival
Tipped
Feds;
Controversial
GOP
Operative’s Letter to FBI About Spitzer’s Trysts ‘Taint’s Probe of Former Guv,”
Prof Says, NEWSDAY, March 24, 2008, at A7.
7. Sealed Complaint at 33, United States v. Brener, 08 Mag. 0463
[hereinafter Sealed Complaint]. See also id. at 31–33.
8. Don Van Natta, Jr. & Jo Becker, Bank Reports, Then Wiretapping, Led
to Unraveling of Ring and Its Client, N.Y. TIMES, March 13, 2008, at A20,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/13/nyregion/13legal.html?scp=1
&sq=Bank+Reports%2C+Then+Wiretapping%2C+Led+to+Unraveling+of+Ring
+and+Its+Client+9&st=nyt.
9. Jonathan D. Epstein, Spitzer Didn’t Bank on Money Trail Fiasco,
BUFFALO NEWS, Mar. 16, 2008, at A13.
10. John Sandman, Spitzer SAR Disclosure an AML Breach,
SEC.
INDUS.
NEWS,
Mar.
31,
2008,
at
1,
available
at
http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-34232673_ITM.
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Emperors Club employee who said that Spitzer did not “do
traditional wire transferring.”11
Another source stated that
suspicion was also raised because “Spitzer had tried to break down
large wire transfers into amounts smaller than $10,000, seemingly
to get around federal reporting rules.”12 Another source suggested
that the bank may have filed a SAR as revenge for Spitzer’s efforts
when he was New York Attorney General to force the bank to refund
$20,000 in what Spitzer claimed had been illegal fees.13 Another
possibility was that the bank was especially vigilant because Spitzer
was, as Governor, “a politically exposed person” and therefore more
likely to be soliciting bribes.14 Still another source reported that
sometime later, HSBC Bank filed one or more SARs when its
employees “investigated” QAT International and QAT Consulting
Group, both of which had accounts at the bank, and discovered that
HSBC’s files for the companies “included virtually no
information . . . due diligence was not done—there was no Dun &
Bradstreet, no documentation, almost nothing in the file . . . ”15
FinCEN then passed on the SARs to the Internal Revenue Service,
which began an investigation.16
Press reports differed on exactly why the IRS pressed forward
with an investigation, which included wiretaps and a criminal
complaint. One suggests that it was the combination of SARs from
North Fork and HSBC that started the investigation.17 Another
said the investigation may have started much earlier when the
lawyers representing Roger J. Stone Jr., a Republican political
consultant, “wrote a letter to the F.B.I. stating that Gov. Eliot
Spitzer had patronized high-priced prostitutes during trips to
Florida.”18
Other sources suggested that when government
authorities discovered that the SARs concerned a senior government
official, they had to investigate further.19 Another quoted a defense
11. Sealed Complaint, supra note 8, at 27.
12. Melanie Lefkowitz & Michael Amon, Wife, Close Aide Urged Spitzer to
Stay, Say Sources, NEWSDAY, Mar. 16, 2008, at A8.
13. Tony Allen Mills, Toppling of the Luv Guv is ‘Wall Street Revenge,’
THE
SUNDAY
TIMES
(London),
Mar.
16,
2008,
available
at
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/us_elections
/article3559410.ece.
14. Van Natta & Becker, supra note 9.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.; New York Governor Spitzer Resigns in Prostitution Scandal;
Federal Probe Ensnares High-Priced Ring, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIGEST,
Mar. 13, 2008, at A3.
18. Danny Hakim & Fernanda Santos, G.O.P. Consultant Says His
Lawyers Told F.B.I. in ‘07 of Alleged Spitzer Trysts, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 24, 2008, at B5, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/24
/nyregion/24spitzer.html?scp=1&sq=G.O.P.+Consultant+Says+His+Lawyers
+Told+F.B.I.+in+%9207+of+Alleged+Spitzer+Trysts&st=nyt.
19. David Johnston & Philip Shenon, U.S. Defends Tough Tactics
on Spitzer, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2008 at A1, available at
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lawyer who said, ‘‘[i]f the government gets a SAR about a highranking public official, they would be negligent not to pursue it, if
only to determine whether there was bribery or extortion
involved.”20
A number of commentators noted, however, that while the
system was designed to ferret out major criminals and terrorists,21
instead it snared a man hiring a prostitute, which is not a crime
normally on the authorities’ radar screen.22 Another commentator
quoted Don Van Natta, Jr., a former director of FinCEN. “What
9/11 taught us is the value of financial information,” Van Natta said.
“Money doesn’t lie. Money leaves a footprint. And that’s exactly
what happened with Spitzer.”23
Although not all of the press reports are fully consistent (and
many rely on unverifiable sources), there are a number of key issues
surrounding how the Spitzer/Emperors Club case apparently
unfolded. First, Spitzer made payments to the Emperors Club
indirectly through QAT International and QAT Consulting Group,
companies controlled by the Club.24 Spitzer ordered his bank either
to wire money to the bank accounts of one or more of the companies,
which then held the cash until it was withdrawn by the Emperors
Club or its owners, or to wire the money on to a bank account held
directly by the Emperors Club or its owners.25 Both Spitzer’s bank
and the shell companies’ bank were monitoring the transactions of
their account holders and decided to make a report to FinCEN when
they discovered something “suspicious.”26 With respect to Spitzer,
reasons for suspicion included that his account activities did not fit
his usual pattern of account activity, he had apparently broken
down larger transfers into smaller amounts, he had tried to delete
his name from one or more transfers, and he was an important
politician.27 With respect to QAT International and QAT Consulting
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/21/nyregion/21justice.html?scp=1&sq=U.S.+D
efends+Tough+Tactics+with+Spitzer&st=nyt.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Van Natta & Becker, supra note 8.
24. Brian Ross, It Wasn’t the Sex; Suspicious $$ Transfers Led to Spitzer,
ABC NEWS, Mar. 10, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/story?id=4424507.
25. Money Transfers Spark Spitzer Probe, UPI.COM, Mar. 12, 2008,
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/2008/03/12/Money_transfers_spark_Spitzer
_probe/UPI-92401205333210.
26. Van Natta & Becker, supra note 8.
27. See Mario Bruno-Britz, Spitzer Exposed by Bank’s Anti-Money
Laundering Technology, BANK SYSTEMS & TECH., Mar. 27, 2008, available at
http://www.banktech.com/aml/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=206904957; Robert
Kessler, Eliot Spitzer’s Bank Turned Him In to the IRS, NEWSDAY,
March 11, 2008, available at http://www.newsday.com/news/local/state
/ny-stspitzerbank0312,0,4637246.story; Lessons from Spitzer’s Fall, CHRISTIAN
SCI.
MONITOR,
Mar.
13,
2008,
at
8,
available
at
http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0313/p08s01-comv.html; see also supra note 20.
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Group, the main reason for suspicion was that they were shell
companies and that the bank had previously failed to conduct “due
diligence” by creating a client profile regarding the companies’
activities.28 FinCEN apparently matched the two reports, and
reported this information to the IRS, which noted the suspicious
nature of the transactions, including Spitzer’s position as attorney
general, and began the investigation leading to his downfall.29
As will be discussed in greater detail infra, each of the details of
the transactions would normally raise suspicion under not only U.S.
anti-money laundering and financing of terrorism (“AML/CFT”)
rules, but under the AML/CFT international standard as well.30 In
fact, anyone familiar with these rules can only wonder why someone
would so obviously trigger the possibility of an investigation rather
than simply pay the Emperors Club directly. One possibility might
be that Spitzer was trying to hide his involvement in the event that
there was an investigation of the club. However, as the former
director of FinCEN noted, such a relatively minor detour would not
cover up his involvement in the event of such an investigation since
there would still be records of the payments made from Spitzer’s
account to the accounts of the two shell companies. One report
speculated that the reason Spitzer took such minor steps to conceal
or obfuscate the transactions was not to hide his payments to the
Emperors Club from law enforcement, which rarely prosecutes
consensual sex for pay, but instead to keep the facts from his family,
especially his wife.31
Spitzer’s transactions that resulted in the filing of SARs—and
that resulted in the commencement of a formal criminal
investigation—can be contrasted with a common transaction
involving the financing of terrorism. One typical example cited in a
recent report on terrorism financing by the Financial Action Task
Force (“FATF”) involves a legitimate charity that quickly raised
large amounts of funds from the local community.32 A controller of
the charity diverted a portion of these donations to terrorist training
camps in Pakistan. The transactions consisted of domestic transfers
to the charity and international transfers to an individual, who then
turned the money over to the terrorists. There were no circuitous
payments as in the Spitzer case—the transactions were actually
quite simple and direct.
The only indication that terrorism
financing might be involved was that law enforcement had reason to
believe that the charity’s controller had some connection with people

28. Van Natta & Becker, supra note 8.
29. Id.
30. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
31. Stevenson Swanson, Spitzer Quits in Remarkable Fall from Grace, CHI.
TRIB., Mar. 13, 2008, at 1.
32. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, TERRORIST FINANCING 12 (2008),
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/28/43/40285899.pdf.
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suspected of being involved in terrorist activities, including the
individual who received the payments from the charity. The report
notes that “[l]aw enforcement assessed that the charity was being
exploited both as a ‘front’ to raise funds and as a ‘means of
transmission’ to divert a portion of them to known terrorist
associates of A.”33 However, the transactions themselves were not
suspicious.34
In a typical transaction, a legitimate (or sometimes illegitimate)
charity collects cash and other donations and deposits those to a
bank account in a western country, then makes a payment directly
to the bank account of another charitable organization or business
location in another country, often a jurisdiction with serious internal
conflict, including terrorism.35 Often, some or all of that money is
then diverted to finance terrorism while some is used for legitimate
charitable activity.36 If terrorists are smarter (or at least more
knowledgeable) than Eliot Spitzer, one would expect that they would
not arrange their financial affairs in such a way that would trigger
the filing of SARs resulting in subsequent investigations. There
may be other reasons that a bank may discover and report that a
client may be financing terrorism (for example, they know that the
client associates with known terrorists). However, one can assume
that the terrorists would try to not follow former Governor Spitzer’s
lead by adding circuitous transactions that might result in the filing
of a SAR.
Having demonstrating a few of the key features of some factors
that may trigger a bank to alert law enforcement as to possible
illegal activity and for the government to conduct a follow-up
investigation, and having suggested that terrorist financing may not
often follow such detectable patterns, this Article will turn to a
fundamental problem that goes to the heart of AML/CFT policies, or
at least those that focus on banks and other financial institutions.
There is a constant and unresolved tension between how much
financial institutions should be expected to do and how much the
government should be expected to do to uncover criminals,

33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., MATTHEW LEVITT, HAMAS: POLITICS, CHARITY, AND TERRORISM
IN THE SERVICE OF JIHAD 62–69, 72 (2006) (discussing Hamas fundraising and
money laundering). The author is currently engaged in a project to examine
terrorism financing techniques, sponsored by the United Nations CounterTerrorism Implementation Task Force. Although there have been a few
exceptions, the examples of terrorism financing examined so far generally fit
into the pattern described above.
36. Pierre-Emmanuel Ly, The Charitable Activities of Terrorist
Organizations, 131 PUB. CHOICE 177, 178–79 (2007), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=951003 (noting that terrorist groups support
both legitimate charitable activity and terrorism, in part to generate political
support from their legitimate activity).
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especially terrorists and their financiers.37
According to the
internationally accepted AML/CFT regime,38 financial institutions39
37. See, e.g., CONSULTATIVE GROUP TO ASSIST THE POOR (CGAP), AML/CFT
REGULATION: COULD INCREASING ACCESS IMPROVE SECURITY? (2008),
http://64.127.136.149/portal/site/portfolio/Feb2008FAI/.
38. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, THE 40 RECOMMENDATIONS
(2004), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/28/0,3343,en_32250379
_32236930_33658140_1_1_1_1,00.html [hereinafter FATF 40]; THE FINANCIAL
ACTION TASK FORCE, 9 SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS ON TERRORIST FINANCING,
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/document/9/0,3343,en_32250379
_32236920_34032073_1_1_1_1,00.html [hereinafter FATF SPECIAL IX];
FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, METHODOLOGY FOR ASSESSING COMPLIANCE WITH
THE FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE FATF 9 SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS
(2007), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/16/54/40339628.pdf
[hereinafter FATF METHODOLOGY]. Each has been adapted as part of a “global
standard” for AML/CFT by vote of the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”)
Executive Board; see also IMF Advances Efforts to Combat Money Laundering
and Terrorist Finance, Public Information Notice No. 02/87, August 8, 2002,
available
at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2002/pn0287.htm;
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, REPORT ON THE OUTCOME OF THE FATF
PLENARY MEETING AND PROPOSAL FOR THE ENDORSEMENT OF THE METHODOLOGY
FOR ASSESSING COMPLIANCE WITH ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING THE
FINANCING OF TERRORISM (AML/CFT) STANDARD 1 (2002), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/aml/2002/eng/110802.pdf [hereinafter IMF
METHODOLOGY]. The author, who was a senior staff member at the IMF from
1994 to 2004, was a principle author of IMF documents relating to AML/CFT
during those years. Also, each member of the FATF and each of the seven
FATF-style regional bodies has accepted the FATF 40 + 9 as the global
standard.
See FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, FATF MEMBERS
AND OBSERVERS, available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/52/0,3343,en
_32250379_32237295_34027188_1_1_1_1,00.html (providing web links to each
FATF-style regional body); see also PAUL ALLEN SCHOTT, REFERENCE GUIDE TO
ANTI-MONEY
LAUNDERING
AND
COMBATING
THE
FINANCING
OF
TERRORISM
III-5–III-8
(2d
ed.
2006),
available
at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTAML/Resources/396511-1146581427871
/Reference_Guide_AMLCFT_2ndSupplement.pdf. There are also a number of
UN-sponsored conventions and Security Council Resolutions dealing with
AML/CFT. Id. at III–2 to –5. But, these are incorporated into the FATF
standard through the Methodology Document Recommendation 1 and Special
Recommendations I, II, and III. IMF METHODOLOGY, supra note 38, at 12, 62–
66.
39. Financial institutions include any person who engages in the following
activities: acceptance of deposits and other repayable funds from the public;
lending; financial leasing; the transfer of money or value; issuing and managing
means of payment (e.g. credit and debit cards, checks, traveler’s checks, money
orders and bankers’ drafts, electronic money); financial guarantees and
commitments; trading in money market instruments (checks, bills, CDs,
derivatives etc.), foreign exchange, exchange, interest rate and index
instruments, transferable securities, commodity futures trading; participation
in securities issues and the provision of financial services related to such issues;
individual and collective portfolio management; safekeeping and administration
of cash or liquid securities on behalf of other persons; otherwise investing,
administering or managing funds or money on behalf of other persons; and
underwriting and placement of life insurance and other investment related
insurance, money, and currency changing. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, 40
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(and a few others),40 are required to implement a series of AML/CFT
“preventive measures.” These are rules that require financial
institutions to identify and monitor their clients activities to see if
they might be laundering criminal proceeds or financing terrorists.
If the financial institution suspects they are, it must describe the
cause for suspicion and make a report to the government for further
investigation.41 At least for regulated financial institutions (the
most important of which in most developed countries are deposittaking institutions, securities firms, broker-dealers, insurance firms,
and money transfer agents),42 it is the financial institution’s
supervisors, regulators, and examiners who are tasked with
ensuring that these “preventive measures” are effectively
implemented.43
The United States largely follows the rules
prescribed by the international AML/CFT standard.44
These rules are fundamentally different in type and kind from
the prudential rules that are also imposed on regulated financial
institutions and whose implementation is a primary function of the
financial institution’s supervisors, regulators, and examiners. These
rules are designed primarily to protect the safety and soundness of
individual financial institutions and the financial system as whole,
including, in particular, the customers of those financial
institutions. These rules are about not putting all investment
(typically lending) eggs in one financial basket, or making sure that
investors judge risk appropriately, or that banks have enough
capital to pay depositors in the event of significant loan defaults:45
RECOMMENDATIONS
GLOSSARY,
http://www.fatfgafi.org/glossary/0,3414,en_32250379_32236889_35433764_1_1
_1_1,00.html#34289432 (last visited Sept. 1, 2008).
40. This refers to casinos (which also includes internet casinos), real estate
agents, dealers in precious metals, dealers in precious stones, lawyers, notaries,
other independent legal professionals, and accountants. See FATF 40, supra
note 38, at 12.
41. Id. at 2–3. See also infra notes 42–48 and accompanying text
(discussing these rules in greater detail).
42. FATF,
SUMMARIES,
REPORTS
AND
ANNEXES,
http://www.fatf
-gafi.org/document/32/0,3343,en_32250379_32236982_35128416_1_1_1
_1,00.html.
43. FATF 40, supra note 38, at 7–8 (describing Recommendations 23–25).
44. See FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, THIRD MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT
ON ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 299–303 (2006), available at http://www.fatf
-gafi.org/dataoecd/44/9/37101772.pdf [hereinafter MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT].
U.S. rules are discussed in greater detail infra. See infra notes 45–48 and
accompanying text.
45. See generally BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION: THE BASEL
CORE PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE BANKING SUPERVISION (1997), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs30a.htm (explaining that the Core Principles cover
seven principal areas: preconditions for effective banking supervision, licensing
and structure, prudential regulations and requirements, methods of banking
supervision, information and record-keeping requirements, formal powers of
supervisors, and cross-border banking).
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in other words, the kind of prudential rules that have not always
been carefully observed in the past year. But in general, the
supervisors and the supervised, the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency and the Federal Reserve Board and U.S. banks, for
example,46 have similar goals with respect to prudential rules. No
one wants a bank or other financial institution to become illiquid or
insolvent—not the bank’s owners, not the bank’s managers, and not
the bank’s supervisors or examiners. Each group tends to have
similar interests, if not identical ones.
Before AML rules were established, banks and other financial
institutions did not consider themselves in the business of catching
criminals, especially not terrorists. Now, however, as a result of the
creation and implementation of the global AML/CFT standard, they
are.47 Much (though certainly not all) of the difficulty that financial
institutions have in identifying and reporting suspected terrorist
transactions lies in the difficulty they have in identifying suspected
money laundering or the proceeds of crime.48 This is not a surprise
given that the CFT rules relating to a financial institution’s
responsibility to detect terrorism-financing transactions are based
on the earlier, pre-existing AML rules. For this reason it is
necessary first to turn to the latter.
I.

INTRODUCTION TO MONEY LAUNDERING AND AML RULES

This Article will discuss in detail key AML principles infra, but
because it helps first to have a plain-language understanding and
more common sense introduction to the issue, this Article briefly
will review the key issues and apply them to the Spitzer and
terrorism-financing cases.
Sustained global interest in anti-money laundering policies
began in the 1980s, primarily in the context of concern over
international drug trafficking. Because the drug trade (and other
illegal activity) generated huge profits, criminals found it necessary
to find a way to introduce the cash they made into the formal
financial system so that it could be spent or invested without
drawing the attention of law enforcement.
However, simply
depositing huge amounts of cash at a single bank could also draw
the attention of bank officials and, eventually, law enforcement.
46. COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY ADMINISTRATOR OF NATIONAL BANKS,
ABOUT THE OCC, available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/aboutocc.htm; THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS, SUPERVISION AND
REGULATION, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/pf_5.pdf.
47. See, e.g., THE WOLFSBERG GROUP, WOLFSBERG AML PRINCIPLES,
http://wolfsberg-principles.com (last visited Sept. 1, 2008); see also MARK PIETH
& GEMMA AIOLFI, THE PRIVATE SECTOR BECOMES ACTIVE: THE WOLFSBERG
PROCESS, available at http://www.wolfsberg-principles.com/pdf/Wolfsberg
-Process.pdf (discussing the origins of the Wolfsberg principles).
48. Eugene Yoo, The Institutional AML Challenge, SEC. INDUSTRY NEWS,
Sept. 18, 2006, available at http://actimize.com/index.aspx?page=news21.
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In the paradigm case, drug traffickers receive large sums of
money in cash because those who purchase illegal drugs do not pay
by check or credit card, which can be traced. Because it looks rather
odd, especially to the police, to carry around a trunk full of often
filthy low-denomination currency to buy big ticket items and to
make legitimate investments, the criminal needs to enter the cash
into the formal financial system via a financial institution. Doing so
is referred to as the “placement stage.”49
One of the first AML principles was to require financial
institutions (especially banks, which are usually the point of entry
in the financial system for cash) to identify exactly who their
customers were and to report to the authorities whenever a
customer deposited a substantial amount of cash.50 One benefit of
knowing the identity of a customer is that the bank or law
enforcement agency can identify the accounts of known criminals.
Of course, some customers often legitimately receive or deposit huge
amounts of cash, such as those running a 7-11 or some other cashintensive business. In order to prevent constant reporting of
unhelpful information, the bank, or at least the authorities, needs to
be able to exclude these customers. In order to determine if patterns
of cash deposits do not suggest that the customer was receiving
criminal proceeds, it is necessary for the bank to determine the
customer’s legitimate activities and whether they could be expected
to generate such cash.
Once a customer profile has been
established, deposit patterns that do not fit that profile would
legitimately generate some suspicion.
The bank could then
investigate and see if the customer’s profile had changed such that
the unusual transactions could be explained by some legitimate
activity. If not, the bank could report such suspicions without fear
of generating too many false positives. Such information might be
enable law enforcement authorities to catch drug traffickers.
Under the AML principles, once a bank was required to
establish a customer profile, it would also be possible to determine
when non-cash payments looked atypical (i.e. possibly the proceeds
of crime).51 In other words, it would be able to detect whether the
proceeds might be from crimes other than those that generated
significant cash. This would allow AML rules to include other types
of crimes, meaning those that did not generate cash proceeds, as
“predicate offenses” to suspected money laundering.52 In addition,
49. The background to the development of AML rules is described in many
places, but for one of the best brief introductions, see SCHOTT, supra note 38, at
I-7–I-9.
50. See, e.g., THE WOLFSBERG GROUP, WOLFSBERG AML PRINCIPLES ON
PRIVATE
BANKING
(2002),
http://www.wolfsberg-principles.com/privatbanking.html.
51. Id.
52. See PETER REUTER & EDWIN M. TRUMAN, CHASING DIRTY MONEY: THE
FIGHT AGAINST MONEY LAUNDERING 105 (2004).
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patterns of payments from an account, as well as deposits into an
account, could be monitored for transactions that did not fit the
expected patterns of a customer.
While this was the beginning, the AML system needed to
become more complex and extensive in order to overcome evasive
countermeasures taken by criminals to avoid being caught under
anti-money laundering rules. Criminals would avoid the cash
transaction reporting requirements by “smurfing” or breaking up
large cash deposits into smaller ones in many accounts opened by
confederates or their lawyers, or by legal persons, like companies.53
Money from these accounts would then be deposited to a single
account held by the criminal. In order to distance themselves
further from the illegal origins of profits, criminals would then often
make payments to others, including corporations or other legal
persons. This activity is typically called the “layering stage.”54 In
order to aggregate such payments and to trace them through the
payment chain, financial institutions need to be able to identify who
the real owner of the account is (i.e. the beneficial owner or
controller), and not just the legal titleholder to the account (i.e. the
name on the account). Because this can be difficult to ascertain, the
financial institution would also want to know the customer profile of
each person holding an account to see if it were normal for the
customer to receive and make payments in a particular way.55
Because banking is international, every intervening bank would
need to follow the same procedures and make the information
available to law enforcement from other countries, which would then
require cross-border cooperation. For example:
Assume a law professor has, in addition to her
employment income, significant criminal proceeds from
both narcotics sales and from defrauding her employer.
Every month she receives $10,000 in cash from selling
illegal stimulants to her first-year contracts students
and $5,000 in reimbursements for fictional travel to
law review symposia. Her legitimate bank deposits
would include such items as law professor wages, plus
perhaps other miscellaneous small amounts (e.g.
interest on savings accounts and the occasional holiday
gift).
Her bank transactions would also include
regular, often recurring payments (e.g. rent, utilities,
and payments for credit card debt).
53. INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH, ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING
AUDIT & COMPLIANCE FORUM: GLOSSARY, http://www.iirusa.com/AMLAC2006
/2688.xml (last visited Sept. 1, 2008).
54. Eduardo Aninat et al., Combating Money Laundering and
the Financing of Terrorism, 39 FIN. & DEV. 3, available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2002/09/aninat.htm.
55. See WOLFSBERG AML PRINCIPLES, supra note 47.
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Under a client identification and cash reporting
regime, any cash deposits into her bank account above
a certain amount would trigger the filing of a report.
The professor might seek to avoid such a filing by
opening a number of accounts at different banks and
depositing only small amounts of cash into each
account. However, if the bank is required to inquire as
to the client’s profile of legitimate deposits and monitor
actual deposits to see if they conform with that profile,
the bank would inquire as to why a professor’s account
involves only deposits of small amounts of cash rather
than other transactions such as wage deposits, etc.
Absent a suitable explanation, a SAR would be filed, in
this case from each of the banks where the professor
held a small cash account. This would permit the
financial intelligence unit to aggregate cash amounts
from each, allowing the unit to pursue further
investigation.
In order to avoid such detection, the professor
could enlist confederates, such as (other) lawyers, to
open accounts on her behalf. However, if the bank is
also required, as part of the client identification
requirement, to determine the beneficial owner of the
account, the bank could trace the account back to the
professor. While the confederates could lie, this would,
among other things, expose the confederate to criminal
charges and make it more likely that the professor’s
criminal activities would be discovered.
An alternative would be for the professor to set up
accounts in the names of companies and disguise the
fact that she controlled the companies. However, if the
bank were required to seek identification of the
beneficial owner and controller of the company, the
bank could, again, trace the account back to the
professor. The professor could attempt to disguise this
ownership though layers of companies, false
shareholder or director names, etc., or even make
identification harder by setting up the company in a
foreign jurisdiction.
In these instances where
identification of the beneficial owner would be difficult,
the bank could be required to see if the company had a
legitimate purpose, and, if it did not, to file a SAR.
Eventually the professor would want to be able to
use the money in the bank accounts without having to
withdraw cash. This would mean that the professor
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would have to make relatively small payments from
the account either to another single account (known as
aggregation) to be used to make a purchase, such as an
investment, or to make many payments directly for a
purchase or an investment. In addition, if the bank is
required to include as part of its client profile
payments as well as deposits, these payments could
also arouse suspicion. The bank would be required to
inquire as to why the client was making such
payments if they did not correspond to some obvious
legitimate aspect of the client’s daily life.
In order to disguise aggregation or final payment,
the professor might make payments to accounts held
by a company set up for this purpose. Again, the
bank’s identification of beneficial owners or bona fides
of the company could result in suspicion.
Finally, once a bank is required to create a client
profile and monitor transactions against that profile,
non-cash deposits potentially representing proceeds of
crime could also arouse suspicion.
In a nutshell, the requirements that banks and other financial
institutions identify customers, establish client profiles, monitor for
unusual transactions, and report to the authorities if they detect
something that looks as if it involved the proceeds of crime is the
foundation of the AML “preventive measures” standard. Once it is
known to authorities that an account may contain the proceeds of
crime, it would be possible to require the bank to freeze the account
until its final province was adjudicated; if the contents turned out to
be criminal proceeds, the money could be seized by the state.56
Of course, it would be necessary to sanction a financial
institution that failued to follow these rules.57 Sanctions could
include criminal charges if the financial institution, or its
employees, knew (or should have known) that it was assisting
criminals in laundering proceeds of a predicate offense, which would
require making money laundering a crime.58 It could also include
56. Bruce Zagaris, The Emergence of an International Anti-Money
Laundering Regime: Implications for Counselling Businesses, in THE ALLEGED
TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL: THE SECOND BIENNIAL INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
SEMINAR 127, 204 (Richard D. Atkins ed. 1995).
57. See, e.g., Economic Sanctions Enforcement Procedures for
Banking Institutions, 71 Fed. Reg. 1971 (Jan. 12, 2006), available at
http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/legal/regs/fr71_1971.pdf.
58. See, e.g., The Bank Secrecy and the USA Patriot Act: Hearing Before the
H. Committee on International Relations, 108th Cong. (2004) (testimony of
Herbert A. Biern, Senior Associate Director, Division of Banking Supervision
and Regulation), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs
/testimony/2004/20041117/default.htm
(describing
the
United
States’
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making AML rules part of the general set of prudential rules that
the supervisors of financial institutions must implement,59 even
though, as noted above, they are not actually prudential in nature
(nor similar with respect to the overlapping interests of both
regulator/supervisor and regulated).
It is easy to see why application of these principles would result
in financial institutions and investigative authorities becoming
interested in the Spitzer case, at least if key facts happened as they
were presented in news reports. First, there were payments that
were unusual in that they did not fit the client’s profile. Secondly,
there were payments that could indicate smurfing as well as
attempts by an account holder to hide his identity and companies
whose client profiles could not be identified.
Finally, while
identification of Spitzer’s original account did not turn up a known
criminal, it did turn up an important politician.
With respect to the charity-financing-of-terrorism example,
there were none of these traits, except possibly one: if any of the
account holders appeared to be known or suspected terrorists, then
it would be a relatively simple task for the bank to report and for the
authorities to investigate and act.
What should be clear from even a layman’s perspective is that
the transactions, when looked at together, do not really suggest
laundering or corruption. In question were payments Governor
Spitzer was making, not payments he was receiving; even a cursory
investigation would show that he neither owned nor controlled the
Emperors Club or its shell companies. If anything, he was making
payments for something. It turned out to be sex. But why not
terrorism?
II.

ORIGINS OF GLOBAL AML EFFORTS

In order to counter money laundering, a number of countries,
most notably the United States and France, took the lead in
pressing for an international anti-money laundering effort. The first
major international agreement to enact uniform anti-money
laundering laws was the UN Convention Against the Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (also called the Vienna
Convention).60
The convention required all parties to enact
legislation providing for the identification and confiscation of
laundered drug money and to set out procedures of mutual legal
implementation of sanctions for violation of the Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C.
5311 et seq., and quoting the statement of Herbert A. Biern, Senior Associate
Director, Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation).
59. See SCHOTT, supra note 38, at V–23 to –25.
60. See generally United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Dec. 20, 1988, I.L.M. 493,
available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1988_en.pdf. The original
Treaty was adopted in 1988.
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assistance in countering money laundering. In 1990, the Council of
Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure, and
Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime (Strasbourg Convention)
was convened,61 and the following year the first European Directive
on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose
of money laundering was adopted.62
The next major international step to enhance global anti-money
laundering efforts came with the creation of the Financial Action
Task Force in 1989, following the G-7 Summit in Paris.63 The
original task force consisted of sixteen member countries of the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(“OECD”), with the United States and France taking leadership
roles.64 The task force was inter-governmental in nature, with
members
represented
by
financial
supervisors,
criminal
investigators, and prosecutors.65 While it had a small secretariat,
the work of the FATF was originally carried on almost entirely by
its members. Less than a year later the FATF published its first set
of 40 Recommendations, which were designed to provide a
comprehensive plan of action for fighting money laundering and
which looked somewhat like an AML standard. Drafted primarily
by the United States, the Recommendations covered the
criminalization of money laundering, the freezing and seizing of
criminal proceeds, and the key preventive measures for financial
institutions, such as customer identification and record keeping,
transaction monitoring, and the filing of SARs when a financial
institution suspected money laundering. They also required crossborder cooperation in investigating and prosecuting money
laundering.
In 1991, the FATF began its program of annual compliance selfevaluations, requiring the completion of a questionnaire and
participation in its mutual evaluation program.66 The mutual
evaluations involved on-site assessments of compliance with the
Recommendations, undertaken by experts drawn from other
member nations. The following year, FATF helped set up the
Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (“CFATF”), the first FATF61. See generally Council of Europe, Convention on Laundering, Search,
Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime, Nov. 8, 1990, E.T.S. 141,
available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/141.htm.
62. Council Directive 91/308/EEC of 10 July 1991, OJ L 166 (July 28, 1991).
63. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, ABOUT THE FATF, http://www.fatfgafi.org/pages/0,3417,en_32250379_32236836_1_1_1_1_1,00.html, last visited
Sept. 1, 2008 [hereinafter About the FATF].
64. Id.
65. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, WHAT IS THE FATF?, http://www.fatfgafi.org/document/57/0,3343,en_32250379_32235720_34432121_1_1_1_1,00.htm
l (last visited July 28, 2008) [hereinafter What is the FATF].
66. See FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON
MONEY LAUNDERING ANNUAL REPORT 1991–1992 (1992), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/63/39/35752730.pdf.
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style regional body designed to advance adoption of the FATF 40.67
While membership in regional bodies required a political
commitment to implement the FATF 40 and to undergo mutual
evaluations, no treaty obligation was involved and no timetable was
set for implementation.68
The FATF also worked on developing appropriate
“countermeasures” to those jurisdictions that failed adequately to
implement anti-money laundering policies.69
Additionally, the
FATF expanded its membership to include twenty-four members of
the OECD, plus Hong Kong, Singapore, and representatives of the
European Commission and the Gulf Co-operation Council.70
In 1996, a revised version of the 40 Recommendations was
completed which extended AML preventive measures to non-bank
financial institutions.71 In addition, the Asia-Pacific Group on
Money Laundering, a FATF-style regional body, was formed, and
the mutual evaluation procedures of the CFATF and the Offshore
Group of Banking Supervisors were assessed as being in conformity
with the FATF’s principles.72 It also agreed to apply “preliminary
sanctions against certain [FATF] members” that did not comply with
the 40 Recommendations. (Note that the word “countermeasures”
was not used.).73 In 1997, with the creation of the Select Committee
of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures
(then known as the PC-R-EV), the European Council’s FATF-style
regional body,74 such anti-money laundering regional organizations
existed for nearly every significant financial center.75
67. See FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON
MONEY LAUNDERING ANNUAL REPORT 1992–1993 5, 4 (1992), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/13/61/34325384.pdf.
68. See generally CARIBBEAN FINANCIAL TASK FORCE, CFATF: AN OVERVIEW,
available at http://www.cfatf.org.
The “uncommitted” commitment to
implement the FATF 40 was discussed at a number of CFTAT meetings and
later at APF and PC-R-EV meetings, which were the former acronyms to
describe a committee of experts on anti-money laundering. Id.
69. BAHAMAS FINANCIAL SERVICES BOARD, FATF COUNTER MEASURES
FOR NON-COOPERATIVE COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES,
Mar. 11, 2003,
http://www.bfsb-bahamas.com/news_detail.lasso?id=33782.
70. See ABOUT THE FATF, supra note 63.
71. FATF 40, supra note 38, at 3.
72. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON
MONEY
LAUNDERING
ANNUAL
REPORT
1996–1997,
available
at
http://www.jya.com/fatf96-97.htm.
73. Id.
74. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, MONEYVAL, WHAT ARE MONEYVAL’S
OBJECTIVES?,http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/moneyval/About/MONEYVAL
_in_brief_en.asp (last visited Sept. 1, 2008).
75. This committee (now Moneyval) includes the vast majority of Eastern
European states, in addition to the Asia/Pacific Groups on Money Laundering,
the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, the Eastern and Southern Africa
Anti-Money Laundering Group, the Eurasian Group, Middle East and North
African FATF, the West African Group, and the Financial Action Task Force on
Money Laundering in South America.
The Wolfsberg Group of Banks,
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During the early 1990s, FATF members expressed concern
about jurisdictions they believed were key weak links in enforcing
anti-money laundering rules.76
At that time many onshore
jurisdictions, including almost all poorer or developing countries,
had little or no enforcement of AML rules.77 However, it was the
role played by some key offshore jurisdictions that was frequently
mentioned as the most troublesome.78 The 1996 FATF 40 included
FATF 21, which stated that financial institutions should give
heightened due diligence to business relations and transactions with
persons from jurisdictions that “do not or insufficiently apply [the]
Recommendations.”79 Such heightened due diligence could result in
a financial institution refusing to undertake transactions with a
person from a non-complying jurisdiction, but the Recommendation
was vague on this issue.80
III. THE ADDITION OF CFT
Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. Treasury
Department began immediately to push other members of the FATF
to include terrorism financing as a central part of the organization’s
mandate.81 On October 29th and 30th, the FATF, meeting in an
extraordinary plenary session in Washington, adopted eight new
recommendations on terrorist financing.82
However, that the
financing of terrorism should be tied to anti-money laundering was,
by no means, obvious. While terrorism had existed before 9/11, the
original FATF 40 made no reference to it.83 As discussed, AMLs
were designed to stop criminals from taking criminal proceeds and
running them through the financial system in a series of
transactions to hide their criminal origins and/or actual ownership.
Commonwealth Secretariat, and Organization of American States (CICAD)
further buttressed the regional anti-money laundering organizations. Id.
76. J.C. SHARMAN, THE GLOBAL ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING REGIME AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: DAMNED IF THEY DO, DAMNED IF THEY
DON’T? 14 (working paper presented at the International Studies
Association Annual Conference Mar. 22–25, 2006), available at
http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/0/0/7/5
/pages100752/p100752-1.php.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. FATF 40, supra note 37, at 5.
80. For further discussion of this issue, see Benjamin R. Hartman, Coercing
Cooperation from Offshore Financial Centers: Identity and Coincidence of
International Obligations Against Money Laundering and Harmful Tax
Competition, B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 255, 273–278 (2001), available at
http://www.bc.edu/schools/law/lawreviews/metaelements/journals/bciclr/24_2/02_FMS.htm.
81. See SHARMAN, supra note 79, at 4.
82. HM Treasury Welcomes Tough New Measures to Tackle
Terrorist Financing, HM TREASURY, Oct. 31, 2001, http://www.hm
-treasury.gov.uk/newsroom_and_speeches/press/2001/press_118_01.cfm.
83. FATF 40, supra note 38.

GORDON -- FINAL.DOC

118

9/8/08 10:12 AM

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

On the other hand, terrorism financing need not involve criminal
origins, which could be as simple as charitable donations, but rather
a criminal destination: terrorism.
Of course, there were some connections. As noted, identifying
exactly who the financial institution’s clients were was a key aspect
of AML preventive measures.84 These measures could also be used
to identify whether the client was a terrorist, providing of course
that the financial institution or the authorities knew who the
terrorists were. This proved to be a valuable avenue for CFT
measures.
Even before the September 11th attacks, the United Nations
Security Council had passed resolutions requiring all states to freeze
accounts held by members of al-Qaeda and the Taliban and had set
up the al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee.85
The
committee created a consolidated list of entities and officials
associated with these organizations as submitted by members.
Subsequent resolutions strengthened this original commitment.86
Resolution 1373, passed as a result of the September 11th attacks,
extended the requirement of states to freeze accounts to terrorists
other than al-Qaeda and the Taliban.87 The UN General Assembly
had also adopted a UN Convention on suppression of terrorism
financing, although it did not go into force until April of 2002.88 The
convention requires contracting states to take appropriate measures
“for the identification, detection and freezing or seizure of any funds
used or allocated for the purpose of committing [terrorist offenses as
defined in the convention as well as the proceeds derived from such
offences, for purposes of possible forfeiture.”89 Assuming that
84. See WOLFSBERG AML PRINCIPLES, supra note 46.
85. S.C. Res. 1267, para. 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999), available
at http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/.
86. Id. (including links to the relevant Security Council Resolutions).
87. S.C. Res. 1373, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001),
available
at
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/557/43/PDF
/N0155743.pdf?OpenElement.
88. Ctr. for Nonproliferation Studies, International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999, available at
http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/inventory/pdfs/finterr.pdf.
89. G.A. Res. 109, art. 8, U.N. Doc. A.54/49 (Dec. 9, 1999), available at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/financingterrorism.html. The Treaty
defined terrorism as acts described in any treaty in the Annex, and “[a]ny other
act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other
person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed
conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate
a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do
or to abstain from doing any act.” Id. at art. 2(1)(b). The treaties listed in the
Annex include unlawful seizure of aircraft, unlawful acts against the safety of
civil aviation, crimes against internationally protected persons (including
diplomatic agents), the taking of hostages, the unlawful acquisition or threat to
nuclear material, unlawful acts of violence at airports serving international
civil aviation and against the safety of civil aviation, unlawful acts against the
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someone could come up with a list of possible terrorists, financial
institutions could compare that list to their account holders to see if
there was a match, much as they could now do with known
criminals.
The first Special Recommendation of the convention requires
each jurisdiction to take immediate steps to ratify and to implement
fully the 1999 UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing
of Terrorism and to implement the Security Council resolutions
relating to the prevention and suppression of the financing of
terrorist acts, particularly UN Security Council Resolution 1373.90
Special Recommendation III specifically requires that each
jurisdiction freeze funds or other assets of terrorists, those who
finance terrorism, and terrorist organizations, according to UN
resolutions and generally.91 Special Recommendation II requires
each jurisdiction to criminalize the financing of terrorism, terrorist
acts, and terrorist organizations, and to ensure that such offenses
are designated as money-laundering predicate offenses.92 In other
words, knowingly laundering any proceeds from terrorism would
constitute the crime of money laundering, although one would
normally expect that the vast majority of jurisdictions would view
terrorism as a serious crime and therefore already a predicate
offense to money laundering.93
The proposed regime certainly could generate problems with
respect to implementation. First, maintaining an up-to-date list of
known terrorists could be difficult, even if the final list applicable to
domestic financial institutions was to be undertaken by a domestic
governmental authority. Certainly errors can arise in putting
together the list at both an international and a local level, and even
a brief freezing of a person’s bank account can cause serious
damage.94 Next, there may be many people or organizations with
safety of maritime navigation, unlawful acts against the safety of fixed
platforms located on the continental shelf, and terrorist bombings. Id. at
Annex; see also G.A. Res. 164, art. 2(1), U.N. GAOR, 52nd Sess. (May 23, 2001)
(defining terrorist bombings as the bombings of state or government facilities,
forms of public transportation, or other aspects of the public infrastructure).
With certain limited exceptions in each convention, the terrorists must be
nationals of a different state than the state in which the terrorist act took place.
90. FATF SPECIAL IX, supra note 38, at 1.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. It was discussed at the time that some countries, for example, the
United States, that use a specific list of offenses as predicates for the crime of
money laundering (rather than something more general like “all serious
crimes”) might not have thought to include terrorism. CHARLES DOYLE,
CRIMINAL MONEY LAUNDERING LEGISLATION IN THE 109TH CONGRESS (2006),
available at http://www.house.gov/gallegly/issues/crime/crimedocs/RS22400.pdf.
94. Also, procedures for removal from the U.S. Sanction’s Monitoring
Committee list can be problematic. See Nicole Nice-Petersen, Justice for the
“Designated”: The Process That is Due to Alleged U.S. Financiers of Terrorism,
93 GEO. L.J. 1387, 1406–09 (2005); Jennifer R. White, IEEPA’s Override
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the same name; it may be hard for financial institutions to ensure
that their procedures identify the correct persons, legal or physical.
Other problems could arise for financial institutions depending on
how the general recommendations were to be translated into rules
in domestic legislation, rules that will be discussed infra. However,
in general at least, these rules, which one attendee at the Special
Meeting referred to as the “Christmas Rules” (“He’s making a list/
Checking it twice/ Gonna find out/ Who’s naughty and nice”),95 were
relatively straightforward.96
However, the proposed new CFT regime required more.
Financial institutions were already required to profile clients and
monitor their transactions to see if the proceeds of crime or money
laundering were involved and, if appropriate, to report a suspicious
transaction to the government.
Then, perhaps, the financial
institution could also profile clients and monitor transactions to see
if they might have some involvement in the financing of terrorism
and report those cases as well. This is exactly what new Special
Recommendation IV did when it required that financial institutions
extend suspicious transaction/activity-reporting requirements to
terrorism financing.97
Interestingly, a question arose at the FATF Special Meeting as
to why only the financing of terrorism should be included, rather
than the financing of other serious crimes. One participant in the
FATF meeting noted that “under the proposed rule, if I plan to use
my bank account to buy bullets to kill my wife the bank need not
care, but if I plan to use the account to buy bullets to threaten a
local politician they need to report me.”98
The FATF Special meeting added three other specific Special
Recommendations of interest to financial institutions. They were:
Special Recommendation VI, which required alternative remittance
systems (i.e. those that are not part of the regulated financial
Authority: Potential for a Violation of the Geneva Convention’s Right to Access
for Humanitarian Organizations?, 104 MICH. L. REV. 2019, 2024–26 (2006).
95. J. FRED COOTS & HENRY GILLESPIE, SANTA CLAUS IS COMING TO TOWN
(1934), available at http://www.the-north-pole.com/carols/santacome.html.
96. For an overview of the work and procedure of the 1267 Committee, see
Eric Rosand, The Security Council’s Efforts to Monitor the Implementation of Al
Qaeda/Taliban Sanctions, 98 AM. J. INT’L. L. 745, 747–753 (2004). The author
rightly emphasized the “delicate balance that needs to be struck between
having an expedited listing process to ensure that legitimate targets do not
escape sanctions, and putting minimum evidentiary standards and a
transparent listing process into place to ensure that due process and other
human rights standards are respected.” Id. at 750; see also BARDO FASSBENDER,
TARGETED SANCTIONS AND DUE PROCESS, STUDY COMMISSIONED BY THE UNITED
NATIONS
OFFICE
OF
LEGAL
AFFAIRS
(2006),
available
at
http://www.un.org/law/counsel/Fassbender_study.pdf (discussing concerns over
due process rights over specific targeted sanctions).
97. See FATF SPECIAL IX, supra note 38.
98. See G.A. Res. 109, supra note 89.
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system) to be brought into the regulatory system;99 Special
Recommendation VII,100 which provided new rules on information
transmitted with funds transfers; and Special Recommendation
VIII,101 which noted that charities can be particularly vulnerable to
terrorism financing and required countries to ensure that charities
are not so misused, an observation based primarily on a number of
prosecutions brought by law enforcement where primarily Islamic
charities had appeared to finance terrorists.
Special Recommendation VIII was not specifically directed to
financial institutions. Rather, it required that governments review
rules to ensure that nonprofits were not being “misused” by terrorist
organizations posing as legitimate entities and that they “ensure”
that nonprofits were not being used for clandestine diversion of
funds.102 In other words, Special Recommendation VIII had nothing
specifically to do with the financial system: It looked as if it had
primarily to do with the regulation of charities, similar to the
example discussed earlier in this Article.
But Special
Recommendation VIII did suggest that charities may be among the
more likely terrorism-financing culprits.103 For this reason, it could
be that financial institutions should focus at least some of their
suspicious-activity monitoring on this type of client, as they already
did for politicians.
However, if in fact most charities made
payments directly to other charities without following particular
patterns that suggested a heightened risk of terrorism financing,
then it would be difficult for financial institutions to determine
when a transaction was actually suspicious and when to file a SAR
with a government agency.
IV. DETAILS ON THE GLOBAL AML/CFT STANDARD
In order to understand the magnitude of the task devolved by
the FATF Special Meeting on financial institutions,104 it is necessary
to take a more detailed look at the preventive measures briefly
outlined above and how they are implemented in practice.
As noted earlier, before the adoption of the Special
Recommendations in 2001, the FATF 40 established a process or
strategy through which financial institutions and government
authorities would play a role in identifying proceeds of crime.105 In
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

See FATF SPECIAL IX, supra note 38, at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, INTERPRETATIVE NOTE TO SPECIAL
RECOMMENDATION
VIII:
NON-PROFIT
ORGANISATIONS,
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/5/38816530.pdf.
104. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. Following adoption of
Special Recommendation VIII by the FATF, the recommendations became part
of the international standard. Id.
105. Id.
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essence, financial institutions are required to identify clients, create
client profiles, monitor transactions, and report suspicious activity
to government authorities, who then identify cases from those
reports for further investigation, and, if necessary, issue orders for
freezing the suspected proceeds of crime. Within this overall
strategy, financial institutions are tasked specifically with
implementing systems to detect suspicious or unusual transactions
or funds, examining them, and reporting those they suspect are
results of the proceeds of crime.106 This Article refers to this
requirement as the “detection, examination, and reporting system.”
Key to this overall strategy are the Financial Intelligence Units
(“FIUs”), a role played in the United States by FinCEN, noted
earlier in the discussion of the Spitzer case. FinCEN serves as a
national center for receiving, analyzing, and disseminating SARs,
along with other information regarding potential money laundering
(and now terrorism financing).107 The FIU should also have access
to other financial, administrative, and law enforcement information
so that it can analyze SARs.108 Actually, FinCEN operates slightly
differently than the FIUs of most other countries in that it
disseminates essentially all SARs to law enforcement authorities,
who then conduct investigations with the assistance of FinCEN.109
The FIU and other authorities that investigate possible crimes
are tasked with identifying what they believe actually are criminal
proceeds, that is, with the level of certainty required by the domestic
justice systems for asset seizure/confiscation/criminal prosecution,
along with supporting evidence.110
This second, or criminal
investigation system, may build on information provided by the
detection, examination, and reporting systems, but extends far
beyond it.
In effect, the combined strategy outsources some aspects of law
enforcement from the criminal investigation system to financial
institutions,111 turning financial institutions into (unpaid) agents of
106. FATF 40, supra note 38, at 6, 27.
107. FINCEN, WHAT WE DO, http://www.fincen.gov/about_fincen/wwd
/index.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2008) [hereinafter WHAT WE DO].
108. See FATF 40, supra note 38, at 8.
109. MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 44, at 60; see also WHAT WE
DO, supra note 107.
110. Depending on the jurisdiction, different levels of proof may be required
for confiscation of criminal proceeds and for conviction of persons for the crime
of money laundering. Temporary or provisional measures such as freezing or
seizing assets typically do not require full judicial process. INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND, MEXICO: REPORT ON THE OBSERVANCE OF STANDARDS AND
CODES—FATF RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND
COMBATING
THE
FINANCING
OF
TERRORISM
(2005),
available
at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2005/cr05436.pdf.
111. Such outsourcing is described by some authors as “horizontal
subsidiarity.” See, e.g., WOLFGANG H. REINICKE, GLOBAL PUBLIC POLICY:
GOVERNING WITHOUT GOVERNMENT 89–90 (1998) (discussing issues related to
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the criminal justice system.
V.

DETECTION, EXAMINATION, AND REPORTING SYSTEM

FATF Recommendations 5, 11, and 13 (and the accompanying
relevant materials in the accompanying “Methodology” for
assessment of compliance) set out the detection, examination, and
reporting systems for financial institutions.112 These consist of
requirements for customer due diligence, including customer
identification (FATF 5), customer transaction monitoring (first part
of FATF 11), transaction examination (second part of FATF 11), and
suspicious transaction reporting (FATF 13).113
FATF 5 requires that financial institutions identify their
customers, including the beneficial owner of a customer account,
which, in the case of legal persons (and other legal arrangements
such as trusts), includes taking “reasonable measures” to identify
the physical persons who own or control the customer.114 The
methodology allows an exception from this latter requirement in the
event the legal person is a public company.115 Financial institutions
must also understand the purpose, intended relationship, and
conduct with the customer, and undergo ongoing customer due
diligence (as HSBC failed to do with respect to QAT International
and QAT Consulting Group) in the business relationship, and
“scrutiny of transactions undertaken through the course of the
relationship to ensure that the transactions being conducted are
consistent with the institution’s knowledge of the customer, its
business and risk profile, including, where necessary, the source of
funds.”116 In the event the financial institution cannot comply, it
should terminate business relations or not undertake a transaction
and should “consider” filing a SAR.117
The United States complies with these requirements through
statutory and regulatory measures,118 as well as through guidance
assigning public-sector tasks to private-sector actors).
112. See FATF 40, supra note 38, at 2–3, 5.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 2–3.
115. FATF METHODOLOGY, supra note 38, at 13.
116. FATF 40, supra note 38, at 3.
117. Id. at 3.
118. There have been customer identification rules in effect for banks and
similar financial institutions in the U.S. since 1983. See MUTUAL EVALUATION
REPORT, supra note 37, at 95–96; M. MAUREEN MURPHY, CRS REPORT FOR
CONGRESS: INTERNATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING ABATEMENT AND ANTI-TERRORIST
FINANCING ACT OF 2001, TITLE III OF PUB. L. NO. 107-56, 2–4 (2001), available at
http://epic.org/privacy/financial/RL31208.pdf. Title III of the Patriot Act of
2001, entitled “International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-terrorist
Financing Act of 2001,” updated and enhanced these measures by adding
several new provisions to the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”). 31 U.S.C. § 5311
(2001). Section 326 of the Act provides for the Secretary of the Treasury to
promulgate regulations on customer identification, and requires financial
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outlined in materials used by supervisors in their examinations of
financial institutions and compliance with statutory and regulatory
provisions. The most recent of these is the Bank Secrecy Act/AntiMoney Laundering Examination Manual,119 which applies to
financial institutions that are banks or bank-like institutions,120 and
where guidance on customer identification121 and on transaction
monitoring are spelled out in greater detail.122
FATF 5 also allows financial institutions to determine the
“extent of such measures on a risk-sensitive basis, depending on the
type of customer, business relationship or transaction,” with higher
risk categories requiring enhanced due diligence.123
The
methodology goes on to provide certain examples of higher risk
categories,124 which include non-resident customers, private
banking, and legal persons or arrangements that are personal-asset
holding vehicles, such as QAT International and QAT Consulting
Group.125
FATF 6 goes further and requires that financial
institutions to implement reasonable procedures for (1) verifying the identity of
any person seeking to open an account, to the extent reasonable and
practicable; (2) maintaining records of the information used to verify the
person’s identity, including name, address, and other identifying information;
and (3) determining whether the person appears on any lists of known or
suspected terrorists or terrorist organizations provided to the financial
institution by any government agency. The final regulations on customer
identification are found in 31 C.F.R. § 103.121 (2007). 31 U.S.C. § 5314(h)
authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to require financial institutions to
report suspicious transactions. It is implemented at 21 C.F.R. § 21.11. There
are similar customer identification rules for securities broker-dealers, mutual
funds, and futures commission merchants and introducing brokers in
commodities. 31 CFR § 103.122 (2007); 31 CFR § 103.131 (2007); see also ASD
Notice to Members 02-21, pages 5–7 (2002); NASD Notice to Members 03-34
(2003). Under 31 CFR § 103.137(c) (2007), a life insurer is required to have
policies and procedures for obtaining “all relevant customer-related information
necessary for an effective anti-money laundering program.”
119. FEDERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL, BANK SECRECY
ACT/ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING EXAMINATION MANUAL (2006), available at
http://www.ffiec.gov/pdf/bsa_aml_examination_manual2006.pdf
[hereinafter
FFIEC MANUAL].
120. This refers to those financial institutions supervised and examined by
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, the National Credit Union Administration, the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Office of Thrift Supervision. The
Manual also used by the Conference of State Bank Supervisors, the American
Council of State Savings Supervisors, and the National Association of State
Credit
Union
Supervisors.
See
FFIEC,
ABOUT
THE
FFIEC,
http://www.ffiec.gov/about.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2008).
121. See FFIEC MANUAL, supra note 119, at 18–34, 45–59, 120–25, 265–68.
122. Id. at 60–76, 149–60, F1–F9, L1–L2.
123. FATF 40, supra note 38, at 2.
124. These are derived from the BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION,
CUSTOMER DUE DILIGENCE FOR BANKS
6
(2001),
available
at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs85.pdf.
125. FATF METHODOLOGY, supra note 37, at 14.
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institutions have risk management systems to determine if
customers are politically-exposed persons, defined as individuals
who are or have been entrusted with prominent public functions in a
foreign country (although countries are encouraged to extend this to
domestic officials), as well as (in effect) family members or “close
associates” of politically-exposed persons.126 The recommendation
further requires that financial institutions take reasonable
measures to establish the “source of wealth and source of funds” and
conduct enhanced
ongoing
monitoring
of the business
relationship.127 The United States has put in place similar rules.128
In particular, while United States guidance documents require
financial institutions to undertake heightened due diligence when
clients are politically exposed persons, this group only includes
“foreign” persons.129 Eliot Spitzer would not be a politically exposed
person under this standard.
FATF 11 requires that financial institutions pay “special”
attention to complex and unusually large or unusual patterns of
transactions with no “apparent” economic or visible lawful purpose,
examine “as far as possible” the background and purpose of such
transactions, and establish “the findings” in writing.130
Interestingly, this requirement is separate from Recommendation
5(c)’s requirement for ongoing customer due diligence with respect
to “scrutiny of transactions.”131 FATF 13 requires that a financial
institution report promptly to the financial intelligence unit if it
suspects, or has reasonable grounds to suspect, that funds are the
proceeds of a criminal activity, which the methodology further
defines as filing a SAR.132 Again, U.S. rules comply with these
requirements.133
With the exception of the addition of the reference to risk-based
systems (including politically exposed persons), the customer due
diligence and transaction monitoring and suspicious transaction
reporting requirements in the FATF Preventive Measures differ
little from those in the previous version adopted in 1996. Although
the three recommendations (and their counterparts in U.S. rules) do
not say so explicitly or in so many words, they form a system134
126. Id. at 81.
127. FATF 40, supra note 38, at 3–4.
128. The United States has adopted a risk-based system. See, e.g., FFIEC
MANUAL, supra note 119, at 11–27, I-1, K-1, M-1 to -2.
129. Id. at 21, 118–22, 261–64. Section 312 of the U.S. Patriot Act requires
institutions to establish special due-diligence procedures with respect to private
banking accounts held by, or on behalf of, a non-U.S. person. Id.
130. FATF 40, supra note 38, at 5.
131. Id. at 3.
132. Id. at 5.
133. 31 CFR § 103.18 to .19 (2007) (setting forth U.S. rules on investigation
and reporting).
134. A working group consisting of the Commonwealth Secretariat, the
UNODCP, the World Bank, and the IMF has been engaged in drafting a model
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whereby financial institutions must (1) identify customers (and the
beneficial owner if different); (2) establish and maintain an up-todate customer profile;135 (3) monitor transactions to see if they fit
with the customer profile; (4) if not, examine the transaction to see if
it might represent the proceeds of crime, including by examining the
source of funds; and (5) if so, report the transaction to the financial
intelligence unit (along with a description of why the financial
institution believes that the transaction is suspicious).
In implementing these five steps, financial institutions may use
a risk-based system (in the United States they must use such a
system) applying enhanced customer due diligence to higher risk
customers and reduced customer due diligence to lower risk
customers.136
However, the recommendations do not give guidance as to
exactly how far, and with what criteria, financial institutions should
go in implementing Steps 1 through 4 above, and when they should
file a SAR under Step 5. And, although there are many places
within the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council
(“FFIEC”) Manual where helpful “flags” are given as to what would
constitute a possible need for heightened scrutiny,137 there is no
guidance there either as to exactly how far, and using what criteria,
financial institutions should go.
As one can readily imagine, this creates a serious problem for
implementation. Suspicious transactions will nearly always have
relatively different risk rankings ( i.e. the degrees of likelihood that
criminal proceeds are involved), and suspicious transactions will
tend to differ with respect to the total amount of criminal proceeds
involved. In short, the FATF Preventive Measures do not describe
regulation for the prevention of money laundering and the financing of
terrorism (“Model Regulation”). The most recent draft of the Model Regulation
implements, inter alia, FATF 4 through 2, and is based on the regulatory
frameworks in the UK, Canada, Australia, Hong Kong SAR, and a number of
other Commonwealth countries. Article 5.1(a-e) of the Model Regulation
outlines CDD as the “(a) identification of customers, including beneficial
owners; (b) gathering of information on customers to create a customer profile;
(c) application of acceptance policies to new customers; (d) maintenance of
customer information on an ongoing basis; [and the] (e) monitoring of customer
transactions.”
Model Regulation (2006) (on file with Financial Market
Integrity, the World Bank). Article 10 describes a customer profile as being “of
sufficient nature and detail . . . to monitor the customer’s transactions, apply
enhanced customer due diligence where necessary, and detect suspicious
transactions.” Id.
135. Presumably, if the customer profile suggests that proceeds of crime are
involved, the financial institution should go directly to Step 4.
136. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, GUIDANCE ON THE RISK-BASED APPROACH
TO
COMBATING
MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING
2,
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/46/38960576.pdf
[hereinafter
FATF
GUIDANCE].
137. See, e.g., FFIEC MANUAL, supra note 119, at 61.
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with any precision at what point on the risk continuum financial
institutions should identify suspicious transactions (i.e., the
continuum stretching from all transactions about which a financial
institution may have any suspicion at all to those for which financial
institutions have a very strong suspicion).
Also, the FATF Preventive Measures do not provide guidance as
to whether financial institutions should consider all transactions
equally, regardless of the size of the suspected criminal proceeds, or
whether they should focus on transactions with relatively larger
amounts of suspected criminal proceeds. The wording of the
recommendations themselves includes a number of terms that are
not easily defined in practice and therefore add significantly to the
problem. For example, what are “reasonable measures” when it
comes to identifying a beneficial owner/controller? How detailed
must a “risk profile” be, and when will it be “necessary” to identify
the source of funds? With respect to politically exposed persons,
what are “reasonable measures” to establish the source of wealth
and source of funds, and what constitutes “enhanced” monitoring?
What does it mean to examine “as far as possible” the “background”
and “purpose” of unusual transactions? Again, there is little help in
the FFIEC Manual.
VI. CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION SYSTEM
Even with its shortcomings, the discussion in the FATF 40 of
the detection, examination, and reporting system is considerably
more developed than that of the criminal investigations system.
While many of the Recommendations discuss the tools that should
be available for investigations, there is very little discussion of
exactly what the FIUs or investigating authorities should do. The
FATF 26 states only that an FIU should be a “national centre for
receiving (and as permitted, requesting), analysis, and
dissemination of a suspicious activity/transaction report and other
information regarding money laundering or terrorist financing.”138
FinCEN appears to have insufficient direction as to its exact role in
the detection, examination, and reporting system, much like the
insufficient direction as to where the role of financial institutions
should end and FinCEN and government investigators should
begin.139
A.

Development and Implementation of Preventive Measures
Under the FATF Preventive Measures, financial institutions

138. The methodology goes on to reference the Egmont Group Statement of
Purpose, which adds little to what is found in Recommendation 26 and does not
discuss what “analysis” means or how the financial institution’s detection and
reporting of a suspicious transaction differ from a FIU’s “analysis” of the
transaction. FATF 40, supra note 38, at 8.
139. See MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 44, at 60–67.
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must develop (and implement) their own systems to carry out their
detection, examination, and reporting requirements.140 As part of
the five basic steps of the detection, examination, and reporting
system, financial institutions need to develop ways of identifying
types of customers and types of transactions that, in addition to
being “unusual,” indicate a higher risk for the generation of criminal
proceeds.141 Financial institutions must develop systems that they
believe will bear fruit in identifying transactions that are more
likely to suggest criminal proceeds than others. However, the
principle business of financial institutions is not criminal law
enforcement. There are a number of ways that financial institutions
try to fulfill their obligations in this regard.
B.

Methods, Trends, and Typologies

Money laundering methods, trends, and typologies have
emerged as key tools for financial institutions to implement their
AML duties under the FATF Recommendations. At least in theory,
typologies describe typical tactics used by launderers or patterns
that indicate a higher risk of laundering. Special typologies are
often described for different categories of criminals or types of
criminal proceeds. Typologies (and other guidance with respect to
identifying laundering) are produced and published by the FATF,
FATF-Style Regional Bodies (“FSRBs”)142 and national competent
authorities, especially FIUs. While these typologies and other
information provide some guidance, according to surveys of financial
institutions, they believe the information provided to be extremely
general and therefore of little use in identifying transactions that
are of a materially higher risk than other transactions. Therefore,
the recommendations do not provide sufficient assistance to
financial institutions designing and implementing their risk-based
preventive measures requirements.143 As the European Commission
140. See, e.g., FATF 40, supra note 38, at 8.
141. FATF GUIDANCE, supra note 136, at 3.
142. See, e.g., FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, FATF METHODS & TRENDS,
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_32250379_32237277_1_1_1_1_1,00.html;
FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, REPORT ON MONEY LAUNDERING TYPOLOGIES
2003-2004,
19–23,
available
at
http://www.fatfgafi.org/dataoecd/19/11/33624379.pdf (discussing Politically Exposes Persons
(“PEPs”)); FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, REPORT ON MONEY LAUNDERING
TYPOLOGIES
2001-2002,
12–14,
available
at
http://www.fatfgafi.org/dataoecd/29/35/34038006.pdf (discussing corruption and private
banking).
143. MATTHEW H. FLEMING, UK LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY USE AND
MANAGEMENT
OF
SARS:
TOWARDS
DETERMINING
THE
VALUE OF THE REGIME
55,
59–60
(2005),
available
at
http://www.jdi.ucl.ac.uk/downloads/publications/research_reports/Fleming_LEA
_Use_and_Mgmt_of_SARs_June2005.pdf (noting that there is a perception
among financial institutions in Australia, the U.S., the U.K., France, and other
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noted, the AML and CFT systems can only work if (among other
things) financial institutions have expertise to carry out the first
risk analysis.144
C. Feedback from Financial Intelligence Units and Other
Government Agencies
These problems are seriously compounded because of the
critical lack of feedback from FIUs (or other parts of the criminal
investigations system) to financial institutions as to any aspect of
the SAR systems. As discussed above, financial institutions rely on
money laundering typologies to help design their AML systems.
However, except in very rare cases, financial institutions report that
they are not told if a SAR has resulted in a real positive, let alone
what aspects of the report were useful to the FIU (or other part of
the criminal investigations system) in identifying criminals or
criminal proceeds.145
Without such information, financial
institutions can only guess to what degree they are successful in
identifying suspicious transactions.
D.

Costs

While public sector investigative duties are normally financed
through general revenues, financial institutions’ detection,
examination, and reporting duties must normally be financed by
increasing prices the institutions charge clients, reducing net
profits, or (most probably) a mix of the two. Higher financial
institution prices can have significant and adverse public policy
effects, such as decreasing access to financial services by low income
clients.146
Reports suggest that financial institution costs in
implementing preventive measures have been increasing
significantly.147
OECD countries that there is little useful information provided by domestic
financial intelligence units to financial institutions, especially with respect to
identifying typologies, including new money laundering techniques, trends
within existing techniques, and the relative identification of more prominent
typologies).
144. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, DIRECTORATE-GENERAL JUSTICE FREEDOM AND
SECURITY, FINAL REPORT 30 (2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice
_home/doc_centre/terrorism/docs/report_01_02_07_with_appendix_en.pdf.
145. See, e.g., id. at 53 (indicating that financial institutions want to know
which suspicious activity/transaction reports were helpful and why).
146. See generally JENNIFER ISERN & DAVID PORTEOUS, AML/CFT
REGULATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR FINANCIAL SERVICE PROVIDERS THAT SERVE LOWINCOME PEOPLE (2005) (discussing, inter alia, how increased costs due to
implementation of AML/CFT regulations may reduce the supply of affordable
financial services to low-income persons).
147. Alan E. Sorcher, Lost in Implementation: Financial Institutions Face
Challenges Complying with Anti-Money Laundering Laws, 18 TRANSNAT’L L.
395, 396 (2005) (noting that banks have significantly increased their spending
on AML/CFT procedures); KPMG INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL ANTI-MONEY
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Also,
assuming
that
increasingly
onerous
detection,
examination, and reporting duties are likely to increase financial
institutions’ marginal costs, a conflict of interest arises between the
financial institution as the “agent” and the criminal investigations
system as the “principal.” While FATF 40 does not suggest that
financial institutions should be compensated for implementing their
agency duties, FATF 23 states that jurisdictions must require
financial institutions to implement their detection, examination, and
reporting duties through their regular prudential processes with
attendant supervisory sanctions applied in the event of a breach.148
VII. THE CURRENT SITUATION
Exactly how such a system of incentives is implemented has a
significant effect on results. From the perspective of financial
institutions, these requirements are very serious, even if they are
not well spelled out. FATF 17 requires the imposition of “effective,
proportionate and dissuasive sanctions” to deal with natural or legal
persons who fail to comply with anti-money laundering or terroristfinancing requirements.149
FATF 29 specifically states that
supervisors of financial institutions “should have adequate powers
to monitor and ensure compliance by financial institutions with
requirements to combat money laundering and terrorist
financing . . .”150 United States laws comply,151 and significant fines,
as well as other supervisory and regulatory orders against financial
institutions, have resulted.152
LAUNDERING SURVEY 2004: HOW BANKS ARE FACING UP TO THE CHALLENGE 11
(2004),
available
at
http://www.us.kpmg.com/microsite/FSLibraryDotCom/docs/AML%20A4_web%2
017%20Sept.pdf.
148. Under FATF 1 and 2, a financial institution’s extensive failure to
implement its detection, examination, and reporting duties could result in a
charge with the crime of money laundering itself. FATF 40, supra note 37, at
1–2. Financial institutions will have a financial incentive to reduce their
detection, examination, and reporting costs through a reduction in detection,
examination, and reporting duties up to the point of the cost of sanctions (which
will include not only monetary sanctions but the cost of any resulting adverse
effect on reputation). On the other hand, the criminal investigations system
will have an incentive to require their agent financial institutions to carry as
great a detection, examination, and reporting burden as is allowed by the
enforcement system. Id.
149. FATF 40, supra note 37, at 6.
150. Id. at 9.
151. MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 44, at 164–90.
152. See, e.g., U.S. Cease and Desist Order and Order of Assessment of a
Civil Money Penalty, In the Matter of American Express Bank
International, No. 07-017-B-EC (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Syst.
Aug. 6, 2007), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/enforcement
/enf20070806a1.pdf; U.S. Assessment of Civil Money Penalty, In the Matter of
Union Bank of California No. 2007–02 (Dep’t of Treasury 2007), available at
http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/ea/files/ASSESSMENT_In_the_Matter_of
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In addition to other possibly adverse effects, if a financial
institution is usually sanctioned only for failure to report suspicious
transactions (false negatives) and not for reporting too many that do
not turn out to be suspicious (false positives), there will be an
incentive for financial institutions to apply too little scrutiny and to
over-report.153 Currently, in many key jurisdictions, there have
been considerable increases in SAR reporting, even though costs, as
noted above, have also increased.154 Although detailed information
from the criminal investigations system is difficult to find, a review
of reports on assessments of compliance with the FATF standards
completed by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund
(“IMF”), FATF and FSRBs since the adoption of the Bank/Fund
AML/CFT Pilot Assessment Program suggests that, at best, only a
very small fraction of SARs filed with financial institutions
represent actual positives. The result has been a general flooding of
FIUs with essentially “defensive” suspicious activity/transaction
reporting, which generates information overload and generally clogs
the criminal investigations system with too many false positives.155
A key improvement to the system as it now operates would be a
significant reduction in false positives, though without a
corresponding increase in false negatives.156 The huge increase in
suspicious activity/transaction reporting by financial institutions in
the United States confirms this larger trend.157
In sum, FATF preventive measures do not specify key aspects of
financial institutions’ responsibilities in identifying and reporting
_Union_Bank_of_California.pdf; Deferred Prosecution Agreement, U.S.A.
Banco
Popular
de
Puerto
Rico
(D.P.R.
2003),
available
at
http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/ea/files/bancopopular.pdf.
153. See generally Elod Takats, A Theory of ‘Crying Wolf’: The Economics of
Money Laundering Enforcement 4
(International Monetary
Fund
Working
Paper
No.
07/81,
2007),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=979035 (laying out a theoretical argument for
increasing filings of defense suspicious-activity reports by reporting
institutions).
154. See generally STEPHEN LANDER, SERIOUS ORGANISED CRIMES AGENCY,
REVIEW
OF
THE
SARS
REGIME
13
(2006),
available
at
http://www.soca.gov.uk/downloads/SOCAtheSARsReview_FINAL_Web.pdf
(discussing increases in STR reporting); Michael Levi & Peter Reuter, Money
Laundering, 34 CRIME & JUST. 289 (2006). Of course, if a financial institution is
sanctioned for reporting too many false positives, there will be a disincentive to
report and a possible increase in false negatives.
155. See LANDER, supra note 154; Levi & Reuter, supra note 162, at 313;
FLEMING, supra note 143, at 10, 35, 36.
156. See REUTER, supra note 52, at 94, 101–02 (discussing benefits of
reducing false positives).
157. This conclusion is supported by specific studies of the United States
and the United Kingdom. See Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, Criminal Law: The
Tenuous Relationship Between the Fight Against Money Laundering and the
Disruption of Criminal Finance, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 311, 396 (2003)
(describing increases in SARing in the United States); LANDER, supra note 154,
at 25.
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suspicious transactions, including how many resources they should
resort to in identifying the bona fides of payment origins or of
owners and controllers of accounts, how much scrutiny should be
applied to transactions, and how many false positives and false
negatives are reasonable. The more effort financial institutions put
into such activities, the more costly it is (with serious potential
downsides for consumers of financial institution services). And,
while over-reporting creates serious problems for the criminal
investigations system, it seems to be the norm.158 Nevertheless, the
criminal investigations system gives little help to financial
institutions by failing to proide detailed typologies or feedback as to
the usefulness of SARs reported, which could be used by the
financial institutions to reduce over-reporting. It would be of
considerable help to financial institutions in implementing their
detection, examination, and reporting requirements if these issues
could be resolved. But apparently they have not been, at least not
adequately.
Eliot Spitzer was caught up in the preventive measures net,
even though he was not engaged in money laundering. While one
must speculate a bit, it seems that his use of what appeared to be
basic, run-of-the-mill money laundering techniques such as
structuring and trying to hide his identity were enough to bring his
transactions to the attention of his bank.159 The fact that he was a
politician (and perhaps one not well-liked by his particular bank)
may have been enough for the bank simply to send along a SAR
without much additional investigation as to whether money
laundering might be involved. The same can be said for the
Emperors Club, since the bank sent in a SAR simply because the
club was using companies that apparently had no economic purpose
other than to disguise their beneficial owner/controller.160 An
attentive IRS agent probably recognized the Governor’s name and
started an investigation, even though money laundering was not
likely.
As noted earlier, even a cursory investigation by the bank would
have revealed that Spitzer was making payments and not receiving
them and that he was not in control of the ultimate recipients of the
payments. But the bank did not need to spend additional resources
to conduct an additional investigation as it could simply file a SAR
and avoid further sanctions. Apparently this is what it did.
VIII. TERRORISM FINANCING
While the problem that the above system creates for financial
158. Stephen Stead, AntiMoney Laundering Compliance vs. Detection,
CREDIT
CONTROL
J.,
http://www.creditcontrol.co.uk/features/legalaspects
/00002.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2008).
159. See Sandman, supra note 10.
160. See Van Natta & Becker, supra note 14.
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institutions (and for government authorities) is clear enough with
respect to financial institutions’ monitoring of client accounts and
reporting when they suspect proceeds of crime or money laundering,
it is far more difficult when it comes to suspecting that terrorism
financing is involved. When the FATF first published its 40
Recommendations, financial institutions in most FATF member
countries were in the process of implementing a detection,
examination, and reporting system for criminal proceeds similar to
the one required by the FATF 40’s preventive measures. But when
the detection, examination, and reporting system for terrorism
financing was established, neither financial institutions nor their
supervisors had much, if any, relevant experience. While they had
not originally been in the business of finding criminal proceeds, at
least financial institutions had years of learning how to do so, as
well as at least some guidance from international organizations like
the FATF and local law enforcement to help them. While financial
institutions appear to over-report transactions and actually find few
criminals, at least they had some idea of what they were supposed to
do.
Soon after the FATF adopted the Special Recommendation IX
(and soon after the United States adopted similar requirements), the
FATF Secretariat published a commentary entitled Guidance for
Financial Institutions in Detecting Terrorist Financing.161 It was
not a promising start.
It stated flatly that “[i]t should be
acknowledged that financial institutions will probably be unable to
detect terrorist financing as such.”162 The paper went on to discuss
that the source of terrorism financing is often crime and may
therefore be covered already by existing AML detection
techniques.163 Even the report’s list of “locations of concern” (i.e.
places where transactions should raise heightened scrutiny), were
largely the same as those listed in FATF 21: countries that did not
comply with FATF 40.164 While there was mention of charities as
being of concern, there was no attempt to tie these concerns to any
special type of charity or charity sending payments to locations
known to have terrorism concerns.
Of course, if jurisdictions were all following the dictates of
Special Recommendation VI and ensuring that nonprofits and
charities were not being used by terrorists, financial institutions
would not have a problem. It would be the job of governments to
identify and shut down charities compromised by terrorists, or at

161. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE,
IN
TERRORIST FINANCING (2002), available
/21/34033955.pdf.
162. Id. at 3.
163. Id. at 7–8.
164. Id. at 9–10.

GUIDANCE

FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
DETECTING
at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/39
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GORDON -- FINAL.DOC

134

9/8/08 10:12 AM

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

least to place them on a list for financial institutions to check once,
if not twice.
Although the United States was the principal country behind
the FATF’s adoption of the anti-money laundering detection,
examination, and reporting system for terrorism financing, the
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States’
Staff Report on Terrorist Financing, published two years after the
adoption of Special Recommendation IV, concluded that:
[F]inancial institutions can be most useful in the fight against
terrorist financing by collecting accurate information about
their customers and providing this information—pursuant to
legal process—to aid in terrorism investigations. However, the
requirement that financial institutions file [SARs] does not
work very well to detect or prevent terrorist financing, for
there is a fundamental distinction between money laundering
and terrorist financing.
Financial institutions have the
information and expertise to detect the one but not the
other.165

Subsequent reports on detecting terrorism financing were not
much help. The UN Security Council, in its first report on the AlQaeda and Taliban Sanctions Monitoring Team, noted that the focus
of the international community on countering terrorist financing
through the formal banking system had led to the identification of
accounts held by al-Qaeda associates. The identification of these
accounts would presumably lead terrorists to seek “alternative
means to raise and move their assets in ways that are less open to
scrutiny,” suggesting that terrorists could be moving away from
financial institutions entirely,166 although most likely as a result of
the “making a list, checking it twice” system. Subsequent reports
reiterated this point.167 In its sixth report, the monitoring team was
not enthusiastic about the effectiveness of preventive measures, in
part because of the lack of guidance.168
165. JOHN ROTH ET AL., NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON
THE UNITED STATES, MONOGRAPH ON TERRORIST FINANCING: STAFF REPORT TO THE
COMMISSION 52 (2004), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staff

_statements/911_TerrFin_Monograph.pdf.
166. United Nations Security Council, Fifth Report of the Analytical Support
and Sanction Monitoring Team Appointed Pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 1526, 1617 (2004-2005), para. 49, U.N. Doc. S/2004/679
(Aug.
25,
2004),
available
at
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267
/monitoringteam.shtml (concerning Al-Qaida, the Taliban, and associated
individuals and entities) [hereinafter UNSC Fifth Report].
167. UNSC Fifth Report, supra note 175, at para. 79 U.N.
Doc. S/2006/750 (Sept. 20, 2006), available at, http://www.un.org/sc
/committees/1267/monitoringteam.shtml.
168. United Nations Security Council, Sixth Report of the Analytical
Support and Sanction Monitoring Team Appointed Pursuant to Security
Counsil Resolution 1526, 1617 (2004-2005), para. 27, U.N. Doc. S/2007/132
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Almost all states have a FIU or equivalent body charged with
collecting, analyzing, and disseminating SARs. The volume of SARs
has increased tremendously, though the procedure suffers from a
lack of guidance as to what to look for, and in many states there is
limited capacity to examine these reports, most of which are
generated by banks. Only a small proportion of the reports are
related to terrorist financing, and hardly any have been associated
with al-Qaeda.169
There was, however, one area that did receive considerable and
increasing attention, and that was nonprofits/charities. As noted in
the discussion of the example introduced earlier in this Article, and
as emphasized by Special Recommendation VIII, charities appeared
(though with perhaps insufficient empirical evidence) to be involved
fairly regularly in terrorism-financing transactions.
This was
emphasized repeatedly in reports that could be used as guidance by
financial institutions, their supervisors, and law enforcement,
including FIUs. For example, the U.S. National Money Laundering
Strategy for 2003 stated that the practice of financing terror
“through ostensibly charitable institutions is an important element
in the global fight against terrorist financing” and committed the
U.S. to countering this threat.170 In its typologies documents during
this period, the FATF also stressed that terrorists often abused
charities. But even these documents focused on the importance of
identifying terrorists and tying them to charities, rather than
somehow identifying terrorism financing through “suspicious”
patterns of transactions.
For example, the 2002–03 Typologies Report discussed a case
where a bank filed a SAR for a nonprofit client, but only because
someone at the bank had read a newspaper article in which the
client was mentioned as being a suspected terrorist organization.171
However, the following year the FATF Typologies Report appeared
to conclude that identification of terrorists is something that lies in
the expertise of government authorities and not financial
institutions. “[T]he best chance of success for detecting possible
terrorist financing links to [nonprofit organizations] is through
intelligence or police work, which builds on links with other
[nonprofits] (operational, financial or through common management
and personnel) or though connections to individuals that are already
(Mar.
8,
2007),
available
at
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267
/monitoringteam.shtml (concerning Al-Qaida, the Taliban, and associated
individuals and entities).
169. Id.
170. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY AND U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
NATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING STRATEGY 13 (2003), available at
http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/sar_tti_10.pdf.
171. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, REPORT ON MONEY LAUNDERING
TYPOLOGIES
2002-2003,
5–6
(2003),
http://www.fatfgafi.org/dataoecd/29/33/34037958.pdf.
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suspected of terrorist or terrorist financing activities.”172
Early in 2008, the FATF released its most comprehensive report
to date on terrorist financing.173
With respect to suspicious
activity/transaction reporting by financial institutions, the report
again focused on nonprofits/charities.
The report stated that
“suspicious transaction reporting has a central role in identifying
terrorist financing and the movement of terrorist funds through the
financial system,” and that “[d]espite the challenge in developing
generic indicators of terrorist financing activity, financial
institutions may nevertheless identify unusual characteristics about
a transaction that should prompt the filing of a suspicious
transaction report.”174 However, the cited cases and examples
almost entirely dealt with organizations, including charities, or
individuals otherwise identified as having terrorism connections.
The only unique terrorism-financing indicators noted in the report
were charity/relief organizations linked to transactions, sending or
receiving funds from and/or to “locations of specific concern,” and
“media coverage of account holder’s activities,”175 presumably when
the media reveals that an organization or person may be connected
to terrorism. The problematic nature of developing a profile of
legitimate for-profit and not-for-profit enterprises likely to engage in
terrorist activity has not been lost on scholarly commentators.176
The focus on charities has been reinforced by local supervisors,
including in the United States. For example, the U.S. FFIEC
Manual states that financial institutions should engage in customer
identification and client profiling, including establishing the purpose
172. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, REPORT ON MONEY LAUNDERING
TYPOLOGIES
2003-2004,
11
(2004) (emphasis added), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd
/19/11/33624379.pdf. The report went on to claim,
The reporting of suspicious unusual transactions by financial
institutions and the subsequent analysis by [financial intelligence
units] or law enforcement also play an important role in bringing
certain cases of suspected terrorist abuse . . . to the surface. In some
countries, suspicious transaction reports related to unusual
[nonprofit] activity have actually led to the initiation of an
investigation, while in other cases the reporting system and [financial
intelligence unit] analysis have contributed to the development of
further leads in ongoing investigations.
Id. However, it did not discuss typologies (other than those indicating money
laundering) of use to financial institutions. Id.
173. See FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, TERRORIST FINANCING (2008),
available
at
http://www.fatf
-gafi.org/dataoecd/28/43/40285899.pdf.
174. Id. at 29.
175. Id. at 32.
176. See, e.g., Laura K. Donohue, Anti-Terrorism Finance in the United
Kingdom and the United States, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 303, 394 (2006) (“[I]t is
difficult, if not impossible, to discern patterns in financial transactions that
would signify terrorist activity.”).
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and objectives of their stated activities, locations served,
organizational structure, donor and volunteer base, funding and
disbursement criteria, recordkeeping requirements, affiliation with
other NGOs, governments, or groups, and internal controls and
audits. And if the financial institution determines that the charity
is of “high risk,” then additional diligence should be performed, such
as evaluating the principals, obtaining and reviewing the financial
statements and audits, verifying the source and use of funds,
valuating large contributors or grantors of the NGO, and conducting
reference checks.177
But the customer identification and profiling is really no
different than that required for AML purposes, nor is there any
indication as to when a financial institution should determine that
there is “high risk” and that additional diligence is due. With
respect to organizational structure, recordkeeping requirements,
and internal controls and audits, it might be possible to examine if
charities are implementing best practices as to internal governance.
Soon after the adoption of Special Recommendation VIII, the FATF
published a paper on such best practices,178 and there has been a
movement in many jurisdictions toward creating best practices for
internal governance,179 including in the United States.180 However,
the fact that there are best practices does not tell financial
institutions how closely the charity must follow them before
suspicion is raised, or how far the financial institution should go in
confirming that the charity is following the practices.
In summary, the guidance provided to financial institutions
with respect to CFT suspicious activity/transaction reporting gives
very little actual guidance. First, there is the general problem that
the basic FATF 40 preventive measures—the detection,
examination, and reporting system for money laundering upon
which the detection, examination, and reporting system for
terrorism financing is based—fails to make clear how far a financial
institution should go to identify clients, build a client profile,
monitor transactions, and determine when a transaction is
suspicious. The financial institution should not go so far as to play

177. FFIEC MANUAL, supra note 119, at 281–83.
178. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, COMBATING THE ABUSE OF NON-PROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS
(2002),
available
at
http://www.fatfgafi.org/dataoecd/39/19/34033761.pdf (discussing international “best practices”).
179. See generally Emile van der Does de Willebois, Terrorist Financing
Networks and International Non-Profit Organizations, paper delivered at The
University of Pennsylvania (Feb. 6, 2008) (copy on file with the author)
(discussing developing international best practice for nonprofit governance and
governmental oversight from the perspective of Special Recommendation VIII).
180. U.S.
DEPARTMENT
OF
THE
TREASURY,
ANTI-TERRORIST
FINANCING GUIDELINES: VOLUNTARY BEST PRACTICES FOR U.S.-BASED
CHARITIES (2006), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports
/0929%20finalrevised.pdf.
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the role of private detective investigating in detail each client and
each transaction, but it needs to do more than make a cursory
review if it is to avoid sanctions.
Next, there is little to indicate that a financial institution’s
client is more likely to be a terrorist or terrorist financier other than
that the client, or a person who has some control over it, is a
terrorist or is engaging in transactions with someone who is. And,
there is little way for a financial institution to know that, other than
by learning from someone else who knows, such as a government
agency or perhaps the media, or, in other words, by “making a list
and checking it” at least once.
However, financial institutions may still see a serious problem.
Special Recommendation IV does exist separately from Special
Recommendation III. That, plus the relatively undefined nature of
the duties imposed on them by FATF preventive measures, plus the
threat of serious sanctions, plus the existence of Special
Recommendation IV may make financial institutions wary of relying
solely on lists, whether government or media-provided. When one
factors in the tendency of financial institutions to react to the
relatively undefined nature of FATF preventive measures and a
cost-benefit analysis by over-reporting, one might expect an increase
in SARs related to terrorism financing, and, in particular, many
false positives.
This seems to be the case, at least in those jurisdictions
reporting suspicious activity/transaction reports filed as indicating
terrorism financing.181 For example, according to FinCEN, since
2003, when records began to be kept of SARs indicating terrorism
financing, and up to 2007, numbers have increased five-fold, from
155 to 687.182 Nevertheless, these numbers are still quite small
compared to those for AML/structuring, which went from 155,468 to
347,393.183 Also, hardly surprisingly, financial institutions tended
to focus on charitable organizations and, in particular, nonprofits
that involve Islamic organizations and wire activity to or from
“suspect” states.184 If you are a financial institution and you need to
report on someone, you might as well report on an Islamic charity.
If the existence of Special Recommendation VIII means that
there is a largely inaccurate tendency for financial institutions to
vastly over-report transactions by certain charities, such overreporting entails many possible downsides in addition to the waste
181. See REVIEW OF FATF MUTUAL EVALUATIONS FOR TERRORISM FINANCINGRELATED SARS (2008) (copy on file with the author).
182. FINCEN,
SAR
BY
DEPOSITORY
INSTITUTIONS,
available
at
http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/sar_by_numb_09.pdf
183. Id.
184. Bank Secrecy Act Advisory Group, Trends and Analysis, 10 SAR
ACTIVITY REVIEW: TRENDS, TIPS & ISSUES 5, 10–13 (2005), available at
http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/sar_tti_10.pdf.
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of resources to financial institutions and to government. If financial
institutions seek to reduce costs by discriminating against certain
charities, this can have many different social costs. If the charities
are more likely to be supporting charitable causes in desperate
areas because these causes are more likely to involve terrorist
activity, the negative effects could be magnified.185
CONCLUSION
FATF preventive measures for money laundering are
sufficiently vague such that financial institutions rarely know how
far to go when implementing them. Financial institutions do,
however, at least have some experience, assisted by typologies
exercises, in identifying transactions that suggest laundering, but
the preventive measures are hardly perfect. Eliot Spitzer was not
engaged in laundering the proceeds of crime, yet he was caught up
in the preventive measures net. He was making payments to
someone for some reason, which might conceivably be the financing
of crime. As it turns out, he was financing what was technically a
crime (albeit a minor one), but there are no requirements that banks
report suspicions of criminal financing, only financing of terrorism.
Presumably, because he was not a charity engaging in transactions
with other charities in certain suspect jurisdictions, the SAR did not
indicate suspected terrorism financing.
In effect, Spitzer used a few techniques identified by anti-money
laundering methodologies as of the types used by launderers. Even
though a quick analysis by the banks would show that neither
laundering nor financing of terrorism was involved, without clear
guidance as to how far they needed to investigate, the banks
apparently did not undertake any serious analysis at all. Instead,
they filed defensive SARs. Apparently, the authorities investigated
because Spitzer was Governor Spitzer, not because they believed he
was laundering the proceeds of crime or financing terrorism.
There appears to be no reason to believe that any genuine
terrorist financer would have engaged in similar transactions (or
any transactions identified in typologies as indicating suspicion of
money laundering). Also, there appear to be no useful typologies
indicating terrorism financing other than when known or suspected
terrorists are involved or when charities make payments to accounts
held by persons in certain geographical areas. And, finally, there is
insufficient guidance as to how far financial institutions must go to
investigate any of these possible criminal acts to determine if a
transaction genuinely raises suspicion, whether it be of money
185. See, e.g., Nina J. Crimm, High Alert: The Government’s War on the
Financing of Terrorism and Its Implications for Donors, Domestic Charitable
Organizations, and Global Philanthropy, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1341 (2004)
(discussing extensively the liabilities imposed by the U.S. on charitable
donations by anti-terrorism financing laws).
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laundering or terrorism financing.
Identifying criminal behavior should always, first and foremost,
be the job of governments, not the private sector. AML preventive
measures should better recognize this fact and spell out more clearly
how far financial institutions should have to go in investigating
whether certain transactions may indicate the proceeds of a crime.
This can only be accomplished by more clearly defined duties, by
providing more information on AML typologies, and by providing
extensive feedback to financial institutions on their suspicious
activity/transaction reports. In particular, a better system of
incentives to reduce false positives while not increasing false
negatives should be devised.
Identifying terrorists also should be almost entirely the job of
governments and not of financial institutions. Terrorist financing
typologies are too focused on certain charities to be of any use in
distinguishing false positives and negatives. If a charity or a person
who controls a charity that either receives or makes a payment is
identified as a possible terrorist, then a financial institution can
implement the customer due diligence measures required under
regular AML preventive measures to see if the customer is involved
with such a person or organization. However, it makes little sense
to require the financial institution to decide who is a terrorist and
who is not. If there was ever a job for governments, that is one.
Under the current AML/CFT system we are more likely to catch
Eliot Spitzer than a real terrorist, and perhaps more likely to catch
Mr. Spitzer than a real money launderer—given the huge number of
SARs that are false positives and the poor feedback provided, it is
impossible to know. This system definitely must be improved if
serious criminals, including terrorists, are to be caught.

